T he Western IndianO cean region is at ac riticalj uncture. Maritime securityt hreats areo nt he rise. The region 1 has become am ajor drug smugglingr oute. 2 Humant rafficking, tradei ns mall arms and ammunition, wildlifea nd fishery crime area lso prevalent. 3 The threato fS omali-based pirates, whoh ijackedn early2 00 ships in recenty ears, 4 hasbeen contained for the moment. No internationalmerchant ship hasb een hijacked successfully since May2 012. 5 However, the pirates' organisational structures remain intact and the piracy risk prevails. 6 The Western Indian Ocean is also ar egion of instability.According to data from the Fragile States Index, theaverage fragility of littorals is among the topthirdofthe world -ranked 62/63 of 195 states. 7 Most troubling is the fact thatofthe Western Indian Ocean actorst hree area mong the tenmostfragiles tatesinthe world, namely Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. 8 Radical terrorist groups affiliatedt o Al-Qa'idaand Daesh (also known as the Islamic Stateo fI raqa nd Syria,I SIS) are also presentinthese countries. Maritime terrorism is at least alatentthreat, with the latest incident takingp lacei n2 002 -t he attack on the MV Limburg off the coastofYemen. 9 The Western Indian Ocean is one of thew orld'sm ostc riticalm aritime regions. It is home to some of the major
pIRATES, DRuGS AnD nAvIES WHY THE WESTERn InDIAn OcEAn nEEDS A nEW SEcuRITY ARcHITEcTuRE cHRISTIAn BuEGER AnD JAn STOckBRuEGGER
International operations against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean are due to wind down. Some major external navies will probably remain, but the region's states will have to adjust to their new role in managing the challenging security environment. In this article, Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger examine the options for cooperation in this volatile region. trade and energy supply routes between Europe, Asia and the Gulf.M oret han 42,000shipstransit through the region annually. 10 Since 2008 therehas been an increasing navalpresence in the regional waters as ar esponse to maritime piracy off the coasto fS omalia. Three multilateralm issions, the EU Naval ForceS omalia (Operation Atalanta), NATO's Operation Ocean Shield and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) arec urrently operating in the region, alongw ith independentn avies of,a mongo thers, Russia, China, India, Japan and even Iran.
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Moret han 30 navalvessels, supported by helicopters, aircraft and support vessels, arepresent in the regiononany given day. Withno successful piracy attack reported since May2012, the debate aboutthe future of the internationalnaval presence has started. 12 The current mandates run until the end of 2016, as does the UN Security Council authorisation. NATO has already decided thatits mission off the Somali coastwill not be extended; 13 the future of the EU counter-piracy engagemento ffS omalia will also be decided soon. 14 Witht his in mind, it is important to consider howt he vast maritime security challenges willb e handled if these navalo perations end, and whether the regionhas the capacity to cope with piracy and other maritime challenges on its own. Ac ontinuation of the international navalp resence in the absence of a tangible piracy threat, however, also raisesq uestions. Decision-makers will need to ask howp otential tensions betweenn aval actorsc an be managed and coordinatedi ft he counter-piracy regime in the regioni sd ismantleda nd other forms of legitimisation arerequired to replace the UN SecurityC ouncil mandate and the currentcounter-piracy legitimation.
It seemslikely thatthe engagement of the internationalc ommunity,a s currently constructed, will not continue after 2016.Y et the maritime security challenges will remain,a sd oes the risk of ar eturn of piracy.T he region will have to gets eriousa bout its future maritime security architecture, whether the internationaln avies leave or stay. In ar ecents urveyo fm aritime security cooperation in the regiont he authors sought to identify the various proposals aimed at building af utures ecurity architecture fort he Western Indian Ocean.T he result wasap erplexing numbero fn of ewer than sixteen strategies,a greements and initiatives of relevance form aritime security in the region. 15 These aimatstrengthening regional capacities form aritime security,t ackling the problem of illegal fishing,a ddressing human and drug trafficking,a nd providing forums for INS Viraat escortingthe Indian Navy's newly acquired aircraft carrier Vikramaditya duringher deliveryvoyage. Courtesy of Indian Navy. maritime security practitionersand naval analysts.
Therei sag rowingi nstitutional thicket to address the challenges in the region'sw aters. While eacho ft he emerging institutions is promising, none appearsfi to ni ts ownt oh andle the maritime challenges of the region. Thet asksa re manifold and overly complex,a nd moret han one institution will certainly be required to undertake them all.Y et,the relationshipsbetween the currentinstitutions areoftenunclear, and diverging donor interestscontribute to af urther proliferation. Sometimes overlap andd uplication might be beneficial, to ensurethatsomeone does the job.Yet,the institutional landscape in the Western Indian Ocean hasreached a degree of complexity which is inefficient. Toom anyr esources arei nvestedi n building the diverse institutionsa nd in maintaining them. The structurew ill not be able to deliver.P roliferation has to stop, aclearvision and strategy about howt he regionw ill managem aritime security arer equired andr egional ownership is paramountinthis process. Internationalassistance is anecessity,but internationala ctorsw ould be wrong to thinkt heyc an dictatet he termso ft he architecture; instead theys hould sign up to the maritime business plant hat the regionprovides. In drafting this plan, an umber of principles will have to be considered.
Maritime Security Dynamics in the Western Indian Ocean
Actors in the regionh avev eryd ifferent capacities and required ifferents ecurity assurances. 16 Indiaa nd SouthA frica aret he only states with operational blue-water navies. They aren ot only geostrategica nd economic power houses, but, together with Kenya, Pakistana nd Iran, area lso de facto veto-players.T heir strategic leadership willb er equired andt heir respective interestsneed to be balanced. ForSmall Island Developing States, such as the Seychellesa nd the Maldives,m aritime security is at the heart of their national interests. Small states have ag reat potential to act as honestb rokers and intellectuall eaderst hats et the agenda forinnovativemaritimesecurity thinking. The Seychellesh as already started to assume this role withi ts bluee conomy campaign. 17 Fragiles tates, notably Somalia and Yemen, aret he source of manym aritime security challenges. Theyn ot only requiread ifferents et of capacity-building efforts, but it will also be mored ifficult to convince them thatm aritime security is one of their topp riorities, considering the difficult developmentand security challengesthat theyface on land.
The regionh as ac ommon pre-colonial history of maritimetrade. For morethan 1,000yearsAfrican, Asianand Arab communities have beenengaged in trade and commerce across the Western Indian Ocean. 18 These regional exchange networkshavefacilitatedthe emergence of acosmopolitan 'dhowculture' among littoral societies, which dominatedt he regionf or centuries. The contemporary regional identity is,h owever,w eak, and therei sl ittle experienceo fp olitical cooperation betweent he African and Asian shores.L ong-terms tate rivalries andd isputed boundariesc omplicate the picture.W hetheri ti st he rivalry betweenI ndia and Pakistano rK enya and Tanzania, Somaliaa nd Kenya, 20 or the contested ownership of islands between Mauritius, Madagascara nd the UK, 21 significant effortsoftrust-and confidence-building will be required. Newr egional thinking, the appreciation of ashared pre-colonial history and recognitiono ft he common interest in ensuring maritimesecurity will be productivestartingpoints.
Maritime security has as ignificant economic dimension. 22 As was emphasised in theU NS ustainable Development Goals, the maritime domain is ak ey source forr egional economic development. 23 It has been estimatedthatthe regional blue economy in the Western Indian Ocean is worth $22 billion, half of which -$11 billioncomes from tourism.Mining and energy, and agriculturea nd forestry contribute 15 and2 0p er centr espectively to the bluee conomy, and fishing is worth moret han $68m illion. 24 Highl evels of maritime insecurity have detrimental effects on regional economica ctivities, particularly in the trade, tourism,fishery, and oil and gass ectors. As theW orld Bank documented, Somali piracy cost the global economy$18 billionper year,led to a23per centslump in regional fishery exportsand a6.5 per cent fall in tourist arrivals. 25 Also,the vast mineral and fossil resources of the regional waters cannot be exploited without asufficientlevel of maritime security.
Largep arts of the regional coastal population are, moreover, dependent on fish as as ource of nutrition. Fishery and environmental crimes directly threatent heir food security.T he Food and AgricultureO rganization (FAO), for instance,e stimatest hatt he livelihoods of moret han 2m illion Tanzanians arel inked to various fisheries-related activities, including boatb uilding,fi sh processing and fisherysales. 26 The causal relationship betweenp iracya nd illegal Maritime security remainse lusive if regional capabilitiesc ontinuet ob e weak and underdeveloped. Nevertheless, morem ilitaryc apabilities aren ot necessarily the solution. While navies playak ey role in maritime security, coastguards and other lawenforcement agencies aree qually vital. Information sharing,t he coordinationo fo perations and appropriate legal regulations are morei mportantf or improving the situation than investmenti nh igh-end navalc apabilities. Maritime security is at ransnational problem.T he pooling of regional resources and capabilities, and jointly coordinatedo perations are essential. Thisr equiresc ooperation and the development of strong institutions and instruments.
The weakness of regional navies and maritime lawe nforcement institutions is not the only problemf acing the Western Indian Ocean.Anotherproblem is the continued militarisation of the region'sm aritime domain. Reducing or terminatingt he internationalc ounterpiracy missions does not mean that externalactorswill completely withdraw their navalf orcesf romt he region. On the contrary,i ti si ncreasingly apparent thatt he internationaln avies did not only come to fightp irates, but also to build up as trategicp resence in the region. 32 This is mostobvious in the case of China, which has greatly expandedits operational experience and capabilitiesin the region. 33 Counter-piracy operations gave not only China, but awider rangeof navies, including from Japana nd Korea, the opportunity to exercise long-term overseasdeployments. China and Japan have both openedt heir first overseas navalbases in the port of Djibouti. 34 India has long seen the Indian Ocean as its 'backyard' and is currently strengthening its militarya nd security cooperation with regional states andislands. 35 Britain and France, former colonial powers in the Western Indian Ocean,h ave long maintainedm ilitaryb ases and navalf orcesi nt he region. TheU SN avy continues to leadam ultinational naval missiont ofi ghtt errorism in ther egion. It has navalbases in Djibouti and Bahrain as well as anaval support facility on the island of DiegoGarcia. Andrew SErickson et al. suggest thatt heseb ases arep art of an overallU Ss trategy 'toe stablish a flexible and enduring presencew ithin a critical and contestedspace'. 36 Therefore, even as the international counter-piracy engagementi sb eing scaled back, major navalp owersw ill Maritime security is a transnational problem maintain, and maybe even expand, their strategic presence in the region. Thec ontinued militarisation of the Western Indian Ocean,h owever,c arries risksa nd unintended consequences for regional peace and security.Itisunlikely thatw ew ill seea ne scalation akin to the situation in the South China Sea. 37 However, tensions and smaller disputes areu navoidable if the regionc ontinues to develop into ag lobal centre for geo-strategicc ompetition. Tensions betweenC hina, India and the US have already surfaced. Some analysts thus worryt hatt heser ivalries,a nd the continued militarisation of the region, willh inderc ooperation and the establishment of an effectivem aritime security structureinthe Western Indian Ocean. 38 Then aval presence in the region is currently managed throught he Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism, ar egular forum in which navies coordinate their activities and sharei ntentions,s trategies and tactics. 39 All navalp owers, including Indiaa nd China, participate in SHADE meetings, which areh eld in Bahrain and arec o-chaired on ar otational basis by one of the 'big three'n aval missions (Atalanta, Ocean Shield and CMF). SHADE is, however, ac ounter-piracy forumnavies cooperateb ecause they sharea common enemy. Withr ecenta bsence of piracy attack, the authority of SHADE has already started to erode. In ap ost-2016 environment, when the counterpiracy operations come to an end, but the navies stay, it is likely thatSHADE will cease to exist. It is not yetclearwho will thenm anaget he tensions, coordinate navala ctivities and ensure checksa nd balances.
Significant efforts will be required to transfer the current situation into an effective, efficient and sustainable maritime security architecture

Elements of a Maritime Security Architecture in the Western Indian Ocean
Significant effortsw ill be required to transfert he current situation into an effective, efficienta nd sustainable maritime security architecture. The architecturew ill have to manage interstate tensions betweenr egional as well as internationala ctorsa nd it will have to build acultureofcooperation to jointly address transnational maritime threats. Yet, it will also requireformats for technical coordination, capacity-building and sharing lessons learnedw ithin the region. It is useful to consider the building blocksfor such an architecture.
First,ah igh-levelo fficial political forum is required to provide strategic guidance, ensure ongoing trustand confidence-building and keep international navies in check. So far, these taskshavebeen providedbythe Contact GrouponPiracyoffthe CoastofSomalia (CGPCS). 40 The CGPCS is an inclusive mechanismi nw hich almosta ll the littoral states participate.I ti s, however, primarily driven by the security concerns of theinternationalactorsand does not addressi ssues beyond the immediate fight againstpirates. Yetthereare existing institutions in the regionw hich might be able to perform ther equired role and take over from theC GPCS such as the 1972 UN Ad Hoc Committeeo nt he Indian Ocean or the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
The Ad Hoc Committee was established to act as the guardian of Indian Ocean security and driveforward the vision of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, an idea the UN General Assembly adoptedi n1 971. 41 Theg roup,w hich wasb orn during theC old War, lost traction in the 1990sb ut has recently experienced ar enaissanceu nder the chairmanship of Sri Lanka. 42 Its 455 th formal meetingt ook place in 2013 and wasa ttended by 43 states andt hree observers,including regional countries as well as externalmaritime states such as Germany,N orwaya nd Russia.O riginally concerneda bout interstate rivalry and nuclear proliferation, 43 morer ecently thec ommittee has turned to discuss non-traditional security challenges as well, in particular maritime piracyb ut also climate change.T he committee actively encouragest he permanent memberso ft he UN SecurityC ouncil to participate and to contributet oi ts work to enhance regional peacea nd security. 44 IORAw as founded in 1997 to promoter egional cooperation.
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Headquartered in Mauritius, it is primarily an economic community interested in trade and commerce. 46 YetI ORA has started to discuss security as well and it is considering the development of am aritime security strategy. 47 The strategy would focus on maritime capacity-building and cooperation to enhance maritime safety and security. It would also promotec ompetitivea nd innovativemaritime industries as well as as ustainable blue economy. The Indian Ocean Dialogue, whichtook place in India in September 2015, dealtw ith issues sucha s' Maritime Security and Defense Cooperation', 48 and 'The Blue Economy as aD river of Economic Growth'; 49 and the IORA Blue EconomyC oreG roup, which held aw orkshop in May2 015, discussed the promotion of fisheries and aquaculturea sw ell as maritime safety and security cooperation. 50 Both the UN committee and IORA arecurrently marginal mechanisms in the regional security architecture, and much work would be needed to turn them into moree ffectivea nd efficientf orumsf or the development of maritime security policies.However,theyboth provide the institutional linksa nd the organisational skeletont of ulfill this function. The UN committee seems the rightf orum for ensuring ahigh-leveldialogue and, given its linkst ot he UN Security Council and the GeneralA ssembly,w ould be an appropriate place fork eeping an eyeon the internationalnaval presence. IORA,on the other hand,isanchored in the region and therefore seems betterequipped to organise strategy on the ground and to translateplans into action. The problem, A high-level official political forum is required to provide strategic guidance pIRATES, DRuGS AnD nAvIES however, is thattheyboth dealwith the widerI ndian Ocean and aret herefore driven by manyd iverging interestsa nd agendas. As aresult,itmightbenecessary either to adaptthese twoinstitutions or to design newo nes in order to ensure focus on the Western Indian Ocean.
Second, institutions will be required to handle maritime security operations -t hati s, the coordination of law enforcemento perations, the sharing of bestp ractices, the organisation of training and capacity-building,a sw ell as informations haring and maritime domain awareness. Manyofthesetasks areinthe hands of international actors. Yet, an umbero fr egional institutions have beenb uilt thati ntend to perform them. 51 This includes those run under the multilateralc ounter-piracy agreement, theD jibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), under the EU'sP rogramme to Promote Regional Maritime Security in the Eastern andSouthern Africa-Indian Ocean Region (known as MASE), or the IndianO cean Forum on Maritime Crime (IOFMC) organisedbythe UN Office on Drugsand Crime( UNODC).A ll three areh eavily dependento nd onor interests. The DCoC and MASE area lso geographically limited. Theyfocus on Eastern Africaand the Arabian Peninsula and do not include the states further to the east(Sri Lanka, India,Pakistanand Iran). At present, the three projects compete with each other over whichw ill become the central coordination mechanism forc apacitybuilding. It could be arguedt hat, given the weak capacities in the region, more is betterthan less. However, in the long run,this would be counterproductiveand ineffective. The regionw ill be bettero ff by betting on one of the mechanisms and reform it correspondingly( fore xample, by including further actors). Alternatively, the mechanism could be merged by integrating elementsofthe DCoC,MASE andI OFMC. This will requireas trong initiativeled by regional actors, given that donor interestsa nd funding structures limitwhatcan be done. 52 The alternative is to create anew and regionally owned institution. This is perhapsal ess favourable option, since initially it would create further institutions.
Third, am aritime security architecturer equires informal coordination and strategic exchange among operatives, strategists and academics. Joint discussions and a sustainedregional dialogueonmaritime security areneeded.This is perhapsthe area where the Western Indian Ocean stateshavethe leasttoworryabout. With conferencef ormatss uch as the Indian Ocean NavalSymposium andits working groups,t he UAEa nnual counter-piracy conferenceand Sri Lanka'sGalle Dialogue InternationalM aritime Conference,a blossoming informal environmenth as emerged in ther egion.T hesef ormats tend to be costly,but have high symbolic value. 53 Theystrengthen acultureoftrust and build confidence andt ransnational interpersonaln etworks. 54 Moreover,i t is in these formats that the regionw ill be able to start to exchange ideasa nd develop astrategy forits future maritime security architecture.
Towards a Western Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and Prosperity
AW estern Indian Ocean zone of peace and prosperityi si ne veryone'si nterest. Littoralstateswith astake in the region, together with internationala ctors, willh avet og et serious about howa maritime security architecturec an be built. Piracy off the coasto fS omalia is currentlya tal ow ebb,b ut the levels of maritime insecurity in the region's territorial waters and high seas remain high. Ther isk of piracyp ersists, illegal fishing and trafficking have increased, and acontinuing navalbuild-up could create news ecurity tensions in the future. As counter-piracy missions wind down, maritime security mustn ot slip off the regional radar.The states in andaround the Western Indian Ocean area ta n important crossroads. Astable maritime domain is crucial to securew orld trade, to harnesst he development potentials of the blue economya nd to protect local livelihoods.T he regionn eeds a news ecurity architecture to guarantee peace and security after 2016.T he thicket of maritime security institutions thath as developedi nt he regions ince 2008 providessome building blocks. Yet, it is overlyc omplexa nd often driven by internationala ctors, rather than being regionally owned. Regional actorsw ill need to geti nto the driver's seata nd start to develop their ownregional vision, comingupwith astrategicplan forhow to transfert he current landscape into an efficient, effectivea nd sustainable infrastructure. AW estern Indian Ocean zone of peace and prosperityisperhaps closer than it willeverbe. It is up to the region, in dialoguewith its international partners,tomakethis happen.  
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